La hermenéutica del juicio reflexivo en la obra de Hannah Arendt

Abstract

Hannah Arendt's political philosophy is fertile ground for reflection and debate, offering a unique and often provocative vision on fundamental issues such as freedom, political action and democracy. In this research, I will delve into the role of judgment in her thought, exploring how this central notion sheds light on her contribution to political philosophy and highlights radical aspects that often go unnoticed. Throughout these pages, I will examine in detail Arendt's conception of judgment, its relationship to the Kantian heritage, and the challenges it poses for radical political thought in the 21st century. The concept of judgment occupies a central place in Arendt's work, serving as a bridge between the individual and the public sphere. For Arendt, judgment is not limited to a cognitive faculty, but also involves a reflective process of discernment and evaluation. This capacity for judgment is fundamental to political action, as it allows individuals to distinguish between right and wrong, just and unjust, and to participate in the formation of public opinion. In her work, Arendt explores the role of judgment in a variety of contexts, from the political sphere to the aesthetic realm, highlighting its importance in building viable political communities and preserving individual freedom. Arendt is inspired by Kant's conception of judgment, but also criticizes its limitations and ambiguities. In particular, she questions the notion of "taste" and sensus communis, pointing out how these concepts can be used to justify forms of authority and exclusion in the public sphere. Who has the right to judge? How is public consensus determined? These questions pose significant challenges for any political theory that aspires to be critical and radical. Arendt urges us to question the very foundations of authority and to recognize the diversity of opinions and experiences that make up the public sphere.