Reforma constitucional en Nicaragua (1987-2011)la paradoja del jinete y la cabalgadura

  1. Pérez Márquez, Raquel
Zuzendaria:
  1. Manuel Alcántara Sáez Zuzendaria

Defentsa unibertsitatea: Universidad de Salamanca

Fecha de defensa: 2012(e)ko uztaila-(a)k 02

Epaimahaia:
  1. Joan Vintró Castells Presidentea
  2. Fátima García Díez Idazkaria
  3. Pedro Ibarra Güell Kidea
  4. Secundino González Marrero Kidea
  5. Salvador Martí Puig Kidea
Saila:
  1. DERECHO PÚBLICO GENERAL

Mota: Tesia

Laburpena

The dissertation proposes a framework for analyzing the process of political and constitutional change experienced in Nicaragua during the period 1987-2011, indicating which elements of continuity and discontinuity can be observed, which is the constitutional cambioo direction within the sequence of democratization, which factors explain the structure of variation examined, and action strategies of the main political architects. The research focuses on one dimension of constitutional change: the powers of power between the executive and legislative bodies, restating the principles of the classic debate between presidentialism and parliamentarism the neo-institutionalist approach in political science. The interaction between actors and institutions in the process of constitutional and political engineering has been studied with the ultimate goal of obtaining democracies respond governable provide guarantees for stability and efficiency. In this sense, it seeks to clarify the political dynamics underlying each of the amendments to the Constitution and the constitutional dimension of the Nicaraguan democratic process, that is, the effects of continuous transformations on constitutional pluralist regime stability. There is an intentional logical political elites involved in the design of the branches of government in the overall process of institutionalization of democracy in Nicaragua since 1990. Therefore, the change is rational and conscious, and is explained by the strategic choices made by actors from various institutional solutions such as specific reform options. While changes to the Constitution also represent an incentive structure institutional, impinging on the behavior of these same agents. Observe how both sets of variables influence over each other to clarify the elements of the old relationship between constitutionalism and democracy discover new approaches and contradictions