Two versions of minimal intuitionism with the CAP. A note

  1. Méndez Rodríguez, José Manuel
  2. Robles Vázquez, Gemma
Revista:
Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

ISSN: 0495-4548

Año de publicación: 2005

Volumen: 20

Número: 53

Páginas: 183-190

Tipo: Artículo

Otras publicaciones en: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

Referencias bibliográficas

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  • - (2003). "Normal substructural logics with strong negation", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32, 589-612.
  • Méndez, J.M. (1987). "A Routley-Meyer semantics for Converse Ackermann Property", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 16, 69-76.
  • - (1988). "Converse Ackermann Property and semiclassical negation", Studia Logica, 47, 159-168.
  • Salto, F., J.M. Méndez, and G. Robles (2001). "Restricting the contraction axiom in Dummett's LC: a sublogic of LC with the Converse Ackermann Property, the logic LC0", Bulletin of the section of Logic, 30, 3, 139-146.