Los problemas de las teorías holistas del derecho

  1. Pérez Bermejo, Juan Manuel
Journal:
Doxa: Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho

ISSN: 0214-8676 2386-4702

Year of publication: 2007

Issue: 30

Pages: 355-382

Type: Article

DOI: 10.14198/DOXA2007.30.39 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openRUA editor

More publications in: Doxa: Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho

Abstract

This paper defines the holistic theories of law and tries to answer the most common objections raised against them. Holistic theories are outlined as justification-theories for which the conclusion of any reasoning is justified according to its adequacy to the whole system of reference. This paper defends holistic theories as the only ones able to overcome the logical problems of justification, and sustains that their main requirements are also common demands of legal practice. I have chosen to address four among the many criticisms raised against them: a) Legal systems normally include many antinomies and contradictions, so they cannot be source of justification. b) If legal systems act like a whole, any change of any rule represents a change of legal system. c) Normal legal reasonings do not appeal to the whole legal system, but to a small number of its rules. d) Logically, holism only works under a strong assumption of unity in our whole knowledge.