Concentración de propiedad y valor de mercado en la empresa familiarun enfoque de gobierno corporativo

  1. Pindado García, Julio
  2. Requejo Puerto, Ignacio
  3. Torre, Chabela de la
Pecunia: revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
  1. Fanjul Suárez, José Luis (coord.)

ISSN: 1699-9495

Year of publication: 2011

Issue Title: Special Issue on Financial Markets and Corporate Finance

Issue: 1

Pages: 111-131

Type: Article

More publications in: Pecunia: revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales

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