El extraño viaje de G. A. Cohen (y de cierta crítica marxista al liberalismo igualitarista)

  1. Pérez Bermejo, Juan Manuel
Revista:
Doxa: Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho

ISSN: 0214-8676,  2386-4702

Ano de publicación: 2012

Número: 35

Páxinas: 281-320

Tipo: Artigo

DOI: 10.14198/DOXA2012.35.13 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openRUA editor

Outras publicacións en: Doxa: Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho

Resumo

The Marxist philosopher G. A. Cohen launched a harsh attack against J. Rawls’ egalitarian Liberalism. In his view, some arguments of Rawls’ theory, especially his approval of incentives for talent, justify broad and considerable inequalities. Moreover, the incentives for talent became the main alibi for all the policies orientated to foster inequality and implemented by governments with different political badges. This essay attempts to prove that, in his legitimate denunciation of the growing inequality, Cohen chose the wrong target: Rawls’ political philosophy owns enough arguments to condemn broad inequalities, including some inequalities which would be inevitable from Cohen’s theory. Finally, Rawls’ resilience against these sorts of criticisms pushed Cohen’s theory towards some moral and metaethical positions which can be judged as radical, extreme and incompatible with any interpretation of what we may call «Marxism».

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Fonte de datos: Dialnet