Conocimiento, racionalidad y ciencia en descartesuna perspectiva pragmatista

Laburpena

Given the multiple approaches that have been proposed to the philosophical project of René Descartes (phenomenological, rationalist, empiricist), the following doctoral thesis articulates a pragmatist interpretation of Descartes’ philosophy. One of the main reasons to offer an alternative reading of the Cartesian project lies in the importance that the instrumental component has in his proposal –which has been excluded by the alternative interpretations of Descartes. Therefore, in order to prove this hypothesis, the work is divided into three sections. The first constitutes an introduction which presents a characterization of the elements that, in the opinion of William James and John Dewey, were genuinely pragmatist. This task of analyzing the forerunners of pragmatism indicated by James and Dewey constitutes a primordial task for any consideration of Descartes as pragmatist thus it allows discerning the limits of this label. For that, we will examine the traits by which philosophers such as Berkeley, Hume, or Francis Bacon were conceived by James and Dewey as precursors of pragmatism in order to show the traits Cartesius must satisfy so as to be considered a pragmatist avant la lettre. In this respect it should be remembered that the pragmatists presented themselves under the heading of anti-Cartesianism, since they understood Descartes under the coordinates of a strict rationalism. Hence, showing Descartes’ connections to pragmatism will in turn imply how Cartesius does not fit a conception of a hard rationalism - whose implications will be analyzed in the section of the conclusion. The core content of the research will be composed of the various scientific articles published in impact journals. These articles will provide the elements so as to structure the pragmatist interpretation of Descartes. It will be, therefore, a set of articles whose management will respond to thematic and expository interests. Finally, the conclusion articulates the various publications and the theoretical framework presented in the introduction in order to test the hypothesis that is supported in the present doctoral thesis. In this sense, it is in this last section where the argumentation evidences Cartesian pragmatism. In this regard, the conclusion has a double task. On the one hand, it will explain what are those traits that support the consideration of Descartes as an ancestor of pragmatism. On the other hand, it will elucidate the limits of this pragmatism, concluding that it can only be conceived as a forerunner and not as a genuine pragmatist.