Democratic Security Policy in ColombiaApproaches to an enemy-centric counterinsurgency model

  1. Jerónimo Ríos Sierra 1
  2. Jaime Zapata García 2
  1. 1 Universidad Complutense de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Complutense de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR 02p0gd045

  2. 2 Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano
    info

    Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano

    Bogotá, Colombia

    ROR https://ror.org/04wbzgn90

Aldizkaria:
Revista de humanidades

ISSN: 1130-5029,  2340-8995

Argitalpen urtea: 2019

Zenbakia: 36

Orrialdeak: 129-154

Mota: Artikulua

DOI: 10.5944/RDH.36.2019.19837 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Beste argitalpen batzuk: Revista de humanidades

Laburpena

Abstract: The purpose of this document is to reflect upon the Democratic Security Policy (PSD by its abbreviation in Spanish) that took place in Colombia under the presidency of Álvaro Uribe Vélez, between 2002 and 2010. To this end, in the fight against the guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC by its abbreviation in Spanish) and the National Liberation Army (ELN by its abbreviation in Spanish), the PSD is understood, in these terms, not so much as a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, but on the contrary, as a predominantly enemy-centric model. It is also theoretically presented as a hybrid model between the scheme of compulsion and accommodation proposed by Hazelton (2011, 2013, 2017), and the authoritarian model that Zukhov (2012), or Byman (2016) approach, among others. In this regard, the work draws on data from the database on the internal armed conflict expressly facilitated by the Vice-Presidency of the Republic, and by a set of in-depth interviews with the main actors involved in the conflict during the time of the study, from the Government, as well as from the Military Forces, the guerrillas and the paramilitaries.

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Finantzaketari buruzko informazioa

This work was supported by the Observatory for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law - Vice-Presidency of the Republic of Colombia.

Finantzatzaile

  • Republic of Colombia Colombia

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