I am large, I contain multitudesepistemic pragmatism, testimonial injustice and positive intersectionalism

  1. Frápolli Sanz, María José 1
  2. Navarro Laespada, Llanos 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

Journal:
Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía
  1. Pérez Navarro, Eduardo (coord.)
  2. Frápolli Sanz, María José (coord.)

ISSN: 1130-0507,  1989-4651

Year of publication: 2021

Issue Title: Monográfico sobre «Expressing Hatred: The Political Dimension of Expressives»

Issue: 84

Pages: 115-129

Type: Article

DOI: 10.6018/DAIMON.481931 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía

Abstract

We explore the compatibilities and incompatibilities between two highly successful approaches to knowledge: Brandom’s epistemic pragmatism, [EP], and the view that derives from Fricker’s seminal work on the ethics of knowing [EK] . [EP] and [EK] are complementary approaches that put forward aspects of the application of the concept that deserve to be preserved. Nevertheless, their mere cumulative superposition produces dysfunctions that call for certain readjustments. We propose a positive kind of intersectionalism, [PI], that accounts for the fact that individuals simultaneously belong to diverse groups with variable epistemic conditions, some advantageous, some disadvantageous. [EP], [EK] and [PI] make a rich and coherent picture of subjects as full epistemic agents.

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