Ambición política y lealtad Influencia sobre el comportamiento político
ISSN: 1405-1060, 1685-2037
Year of publication: 2011
Volume: 18
Issue: 2
Pages: 231-264
Type: Article
More publications in: Política y gobierno
Sustainable development goals
Abstract
El objetivo del artículo es analizar la influencia del contexto político y de la carrera política en el comportamiento de los legisladores a partir de la base de datos Élites Parlamentarias Latinoamericanas (pela) de la Universidad de Salamanca de tres países centroamericanos: Costa Rica, El Salvador y Honduras. Partiendo de una división teórica entre la lealtad retrospectiva y la lealtad prospectiva, los resultados sugieren que el comportamiento de los diputados está influido por su futuro cargo. Esta influencia es clara cuando el aspecto que se evalúa es excluyente, es decir, no permite al diputado cultivar las lealtades de las que depende su futuro sin erosionar las lealtades retrospectivas. Cuando el partido controla la continuidad de la carrera política, el porcentaje que afirma apoyar al distrito es mayor entre los diputados que no quieren continuar que entre los que quieren continuar en la vida política cuando este apoyo supone una erosión al vínculo con su partido político.
Bibliographic References
- Ajenjo Fresno, Natalia (2001), “Honduras”, en Manuel Alcántara y Flavia Freidenberg, Partidos políticos en América Latina: Centroamérica, México y República Dominicana, Salamanca, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca. Alcántara, Manuel (ed.) (2008), Politicians and Politics in Latin America, Boulder, Lynne Rienner.
- Alcántara, Manuel y Lina M. Cabezas (eds.) (2011), Selección de candidatos y elaboración de programas en los partidos políticos latinoamericanos, México, Miguel Ángel Porrúa (en prensa).
- Ames, Barry (1995a), “Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress”, The Journal of Politics, 57 (2), pp. 324-243.
- Ames, Barry (1995b), “Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation”, American Journal of Political Science, 39 (2), pp. 406-433.
- Beer, Caroline (2004), Electoral Competition and Institutional Change in México, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press.
- Black, Gordon S. (1972), “A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentive”, The American Political Science Review, 66 (1), pp. 144-159.
- Botero, Felipe (2007), “Should I Stay or Should I Go? An Event History Analysis of Congressional Career Decisions in Multi-Member Districts”, ponencia presentada en la Annual Conference of the Midwest Political, Chicago.
- Botero, Felipe y Lúcio R. Rennó (2007), “Career Choice and Legislative Reelection. Evidence from Brazil and Colombia”, Brazilian Political Science Review, 1 (1), pp. 102-124.
- Cain, Bruce, John A. Farejohn y Morris P. Fiorina (1987), The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press.
- Canache, Damaris, Jeffery J. Mondak y Ernesto Cabrera (2000), “Voters and the Personal Vote: A Counterfactual Simulation”, Political Research Quarterly, 53 (3), pp. 663-676.
- Carey, John M. (1996), Term Limits and Legislative Representation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Carey, John M., Richard Niemi y Lynda Powell (1998), “The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 23 (2), pp. 271-300.
- Carey, John M., Richard Niemi y Lynda Powell (2003), “Term Limits in the State Legislatures: Results from a New Survey of the 50 States”, ponencia presentada en la American Political Science Association.
- Carey, John M. y Matthew S. Shugart (1995), “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas”, Electoral Studies, 14 (4), pp. 417-439.
- Carroll, Royce y Matthew S. Shugart (2007), “Neo-Madisonian Theory and Latin American Institutions”, en Gerardo L. Munck (ed.), Regimes and Democracy in Latin America: Theories and Methods, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Clarke, Harold D. y Richard G. Price (1980), “Freshman MPs’ Job Images: The Effects of Incumbency, Ambition and Position”, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 13 (3), pp. 583-606.
- Crisp, Brian F. y Scott W. Desposato (2004), “Constituency Building in Multimember Districts: Collusion or Conflict?”, Journal of Politics, 66 (1), pp. 136-156.
- Crisp, Brian F., María C. Escobar-Lemmon, Bradford S. Jones, Mark P. Jones y Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson (2004), “Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies”, The Journal of Politics, 66 (3), pp. 823-846.
- Crisp, Brian F. y Rachael Ingall (2002), “Institutional Engineering and the Nature of Representation: Mapping the Effects of Electoral Reform in Colombia”, American Journal of Political Science, 46 (4), pp. 733-748.
- Fenno, Richard (1978), Home Style: House Members in Their Districts, Boston, Little Brown.
- Hallerberg, Mark y Patrik Marier (2004), “Executive Authority, the Personal Vote and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries”, American Journal of Political Science, 48 (3), pp. 571-587.
- Heath, Roseanna M. y Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson (2006), “Political Ambition and Legislative Productivity in the Unicameral, Unitary States of Costa Rica and Honduras”, ponencia presentada en la Latin American Studies Association (lasa), San Juan, Puerto Rico.
- Herrick, Rebekah y Michael K. Moore (1993), “Political Ambition’s Effect on Legislative Behavior: Schlesinger’s Typology Reconsidered and Revised”, The Journal of Politics, 55 (3), pp. 765-776.
- Kitchelt, Herbert, Kirk A. Hawkins, Juan Pablo Luna, Guillermo Rosas y Elizabeth J. Zechmeister (2010), Latin American Party Systems, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Langston, Joy y Francisco Javier Aparicio (2008), “Political Career Structures in Democratic Mexico, 1997-2006”, ponencia presentada en la American Political Science Association (apsa), Boston.
- Lehoucq, Fabrice (2005), “Costa Rica: Paradise in Doubt”, Journal of Democracy, 16 (3), pp. 140-154.
- Leoni, Eduardo, Carlos Pereira y Lúcio R. Rennó (2004), “Political Survival Strategies: Political Career Decisions in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies”, Journal of Latin American Studies, 36 (1), pp. 109-130.
- Maestas, Cherie (2003), “The Incentive to Listen: Progressive Ambition, Resources and Opinion Monitoring among State Legislators”, The Journal of Politics, 65 (2), pp. 439-456.
- Mainwaring, Scott (2006), “The Crisis of Representation in the Andes”, Journal of Democracy, 17 (3), pp. 13-27.
- Mainwaring, Scott, Ana María Bejarano y Eduardo Pizarro (2006), “Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes: An Overview”, en Scott Mainwaring, Ana María Bejarano y Eduardo Pizarro, The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes, Stanford, Stanford University Press, pp. 1-44.
- Martínez Rosón, María del Mar (2009), “La ambición política en situaciones adversas: Contextos institucionales y personales”, Revista de Estudios Políticos, 146, pp. 113-148.
- Martínez Rosón, María del Mar (2011), “Programas de gobierno en Costa Rica: Procesos de elaboración y funciones”, en Manuel Alcántara y Lina María Cabezas (eds.), Selección de candidatos y elaboración de programas en los partidos políticos latinoamericanos, México, Miguel Ángel Porrúa (en prensa).
- Mayhew, David (1974), Congress: The Electoral Connection, New Haven, Yale University Press.
- McCurley, Carl y Jeffrey J. Mondak (1995), “Inspected by #1184063113: The Influence of Incumbents Competence and Integrity in U.S. House Elections”, American Journal of Political Science, 39 (4), pp. 864-885.
- Mejía-Acosta, Andrés, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán y Sebastián Saiegh (2006), “Pork or Policy? The Organizational Fundations of Legislative Particularism”, ponencia presentada en la Latin American Studies Association (lasa), San Juan, Puerto Rico.
- Moraes, Juan Andrés (2008), “Why Factions? Candidate Selection and Legislative Politics in Uruguay”, en Scott Morgenstern y Peter M. Siavelis (eds.), Pathway to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America, Filadelfia, Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Morgenstern, Scott y Richard F. Potthoff (2005), “The Components of Elections: District Heterogeneity, District-Time Effects and Volatility”, Electoral Studies, 24 (1), pp. 17-40.
- Munck, Gerardo L. (2004), “La política democrática en América Latina: Contribuciones de una perspectiva institucional”, Política y Gobierno, XI (2), pp. 315-346.
- OIR (2010), Observatorio de instituciones representativas. Universidad de Salamanca. http://americo.usal.es/oir/legislatina/reeleccion.htm.
- Pitkin, Hanna F. (1967), The Concept of Representation, California, University of California Press.
- Prewitt, Kenneth y William Nowlin (1969), “Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent Politicians”, Western Political Quarterly, 22, pp. 298-308.
- Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes y Bernard Manim (1999), Democracy, Accountability and Representation, Cambrigde, Cambridge University Press.
- Rohde, David W. (1979), “Risk Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of the United States House of Representatives”, American Journal of Political Science, 23, pp. 1-26.
- Samuels, David (2003), Ambition, Federalism and Legislative Politics in Brazil, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Samuels, David (2008), “Political Ambition, Candidate Recruitment and Legislative Politics in Brazil”, en Peter M. Siavelis y Scott Morgenstern (eds.), Pathway to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America, Filadelfia, Penn State University Press.
- Sánchez, Fernando (2007), Partidos políticos, elecciones y lealtades partidarias en Costa Rica: erosión y cambio, Salamanca, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca.
- Schlesinger, Joseph A. (1966), Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States, Chicago, Rand McNally and Company.
- Siavelis, Peter M. y Scott Morgenstern (2008), Pathway to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America, Filadelfia, Penn State University Press.
- Taylor-Robinson, Michelle M. (1992), “Formal versus Informal Incentive Structures and Legislator Behavior: Evidence from Costa Rica”, Journal of Politics, 54, pp. 1055-1073.
- Taylor-Robinson, Michelle M. (1996), “When Electoral and Party Institutions Interact to Produce Caudillo Politics: The Case of Honduras”, Electoral Studies, 15 (3), pp. 327-337.
- Taylor-Robinson, Michelle M. y Christopher Díaz (1999), “Who Gets Legislation Passed in a Marginal Legislature and Is the Label Marginal Legislature Still Appropriate? A Study of the Honduran Congress”, Comparative Political Studies, 32 (5), pp. 589-625.
- Taylor-Robinson, Michelle M. (2006), “La política hondureña y las elecciones de 2005”, Revista de Ciencia Política, 26 (1), pp. 114-124.
- Taylor-Robinson, Michelle M. (2009), “Selección de candidatos al Congreso Nacional de Honduras por los partidos tradicionales”, en Manuel Alcántara y Flavia Freidenberg, Selección de candidatos, política partidista y rendimiento democrático, México, Tribunal Electoral del Distrito Federal.
- Wallack, Jessica S., Alejandro Gaviria, Ugo Panizza y Ernesto Stein (2003), “Particularism around the World”, The World Bank Economic Review, 17 (1), pp. 133-143.
- Wilson, Bruce M. (1999), “Leftist Parties, Neoliberal Policies, and Reelection Strategies: The Case of the pln in Costa Rica”, Comparative Political Studies, 32 (6), pp. 752-779.
- Wilson, Bruce M. (2003), “The Elections in Costa Rica, February and April 2002”, Electoral Studies, 22 (3), pp. 509-516.