La modelización formal en la ciencia políticaUsos, posibilidades y limitaciones

  1. Boscán Carrasquero, Guillermo 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Salamanca
    info

    Universidad de Salamanca

    Salamanca, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02f40zc51

Journal:
Política y gobierno

ISSN: 1405-1060,  1685-2037

Year of publication: 2010

Volume: 17

Issue: 1

Pages: 127-167

Type: Article

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More publications in: Política y gobierno

Sustainable development goals

Abstract

Formal modelling is a methodological tool in expansion within current political science. Its use is based on a deductive strategy that allows us to obtain propositions, pre­diction or results from a series of assumption, through the use of mathematical methods. To do so, the scientists have to convert the informal model into a mathematical one, resolve it analytically or numerically and empirically asses the results. This validation will determine the usefulness of the model and the extent to which generalize the findings. Both possibilities and limitations of this methodology are determined on the basis of the specific properties of the mathematical techniques used.

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