Causation and the agent's point of view

  1. Álvarez Toledo, Sebastián
Revista:
Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

ISSN: 0495-4548

Año de publicación: 2014

Volumen: 29

Número: 79

Páginas: 133-147

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

Resumen

Hay filósofos que niegan la existencia de relaciones causales en la naturaleza argumentando que no son sino producto de nuestra perspectiva como seres capaces de acciones intencionales. En este artículo expongo brevemente esta tesis y sostengo que debe contar con el complemento de una ontología no causal básica que dé razón de los fenómenos que se consideran causales. Luego describo lo que parece ser una buena candidata para tal ontología y concluyo que, sin embargo, ésta no puede prescindir del concepto de causalidad y que, por tanto, no es el tipo de ontología que necesita la mencionada tesis antirrealista respecto a la causalidad.

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