La invención de clases naturales

  1. ÁLVAREZ TOLEDO, Sebastián 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Salamanca
    info

    Universidad de Salamanca

    Salamanca, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02f40zc51

Journal:
Artefactos

ISSN: 1989-3612

Year of publication: 2019

Volume: 8

Issue: 1

Pages: 40-60

Type: Article

DOI: 10.14201/ART2019814060 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Artefactos

Abstract

This paper begins by pointing out the major weaknesses of the essentialist and constructivist conceptions of natural kinds. Then, it presents and defends the Richard Boyd’s theory, among others authors, that defines natural kinds as homeostatic property clusters. In this theory the concept of natural kind becomes flexible and applicable not only to physics and chemistry, but also to biology, the social sciences and even common knowledge, and the acceptance of a certain kind as natural depends on points of view and spatiotemporal circumstances. However, this theory maintains a realist approach to natural kinds because argues that inferential and predictive capacity of these is a result of their accommodation to causal structure of world.

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