Estándares de prueba en la ciencia reguladorajerarquías evidenciales y pluralismo metodológico

  1. López Mas, Roberto
Supervised by:
  1. José Luis Luján López Director

Defence university: Universitat de les Illes Balears

Fecha de defensa: 13 January 2023

Committee:
  1. José Antonio López Cerezo Chair
  2. Obdulia M. Torres González Secretary
  3. Julian Reiss Committee member

Type: Thesis

Teseo: 786994 DIALNET lock_openTESEO editor

Abstract

. Introducción: Regulatory science is a scientific field that has received attention from philosophers and scientists over the past few years. Traditional issues from the philosophy of science may have a new meaning with regard to regulatory science. In this doctoral thesis, I propose answers to major questions within the philosophy of regulatory science. In addition to posing certain classical questions from the philosophy of science applied to a new scientific context, I deal with specific issues relating to the philosophy of regulatory science. A major objective of the doctoral thesis is to investigate the interrelation between standards of proof and distinct pragmatic factors within regulatory science. I also analyze randomized controlled trials as the scientific methodology situated at the top of the evidence hierarchy defined in several regulatory frameworks. The main case study used to achieve these objectives is the European health claim regulation. The methodology adopted consists of the analysis of different types of bibliographical sources: regulations, scientific articles, philosophical books, etc. . Contenido de la investigación: The results can be summarized in five points. 1. In regulatory science, epistemic and pragmatic factors are interrelated. Both types of factors are determining when assessing the adequacy of regulatory strategies. 2. Standards of proof do not necessarily lead to the achievement of all regulatory objectives. Choosing an epistemic policy also implies choosing between different sets of achievable objectives. 3. In regulatory science, the adequacy of a standard of proof is dependent on fundamental non-epistemic values. The adoption of a particular epistemic policy may be considered acceptable on the basis of the achievable objectives and the set of pragmatic consequences generated. 4. Randomized controlled trials do not necessarily provide the best scientific evidence for substantiating causal hypotheses. 5. The level of evidence required to establish causal claims depends on the goals of scientific activity. Both the epistemic and pragmatic goals of science may lead to the acceptance of a relatively low level of confidence in causal hypothesis confirmation. . Conclusión: The various points that comprise the results are arguments that substantiate my general thesis: in regulatory science, standards of proof are dependent on both epistemic and pragmatic factors. Both types of factors must be considered within the epistemology and methodology of regulatory science. This doctoral thesis could be the basis for a major debate on important issues within the philosophy of regulatory science.