Apuntes teóricos y metodológicos para una mejor comprensión de los modelos espaciales de voto

  1. Guillermo Boscán 1
  2. Pablo Biderbost 2
  3. Eduardo Muñoz 3
  1. 1 Ciencias Jurídicas
  2. 2 Ciencias Sociales y Humanas
  3. 3 Diplomático
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Revista:
Studia politicae

ISSN: 1669-7405

Año de publicación: 2023

Número: 58

Páginas: 33-75

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Studia politicae

Resumen

El conocimiento profundo de la evolución conceptual y metodológica de los diferentes modelos espaciales del voto implica desandar con lupa los meandros de los modelos puros y mixtos basados en la proximidad y la direccionalidad. Su utilización en entornos politológicos latinoamericanos y españoles se ha visto limitada, entre otros factores, por la escasa compren-sión de sus detalles técnicos. Para paliar esta carencia, se presentan aquí sistemáticamente ambos tipos de modelos, haciendo uso tanto de recursos procedentes del lenguaje matemático como de esquemas que facilitan la visualización amigable de estas aportaciones teóricas.

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