Ficciones epistémicas, intuición y conocimiento inocuo

  1. Reynner Franco 1
  1. 1 Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad de Salamanca
Journal:
Lógoi: revista de filosofía

ISSN: 2790-5144 1316-693X

Year of publication: 2023

Issue Title: N. 43 (2023) enero-junio. Lógoi. Revista de Filosofía

Issue: 43

Type: Article

More publications in: Lógoi: revista de filosofía

Metrics

CIRC

  • Human Sciences: C

Abstract

A relevant presupposition of direct realism is that perceptions are linked to the acquisition of reliable knowledge about the world without intermediaries. To hold that the force of reliability comes from a kind of sense activity raises difficulties for both realism and anti-realism. J. McDowell turns to intuition as an enabling unity that offers a key to a model of non-discursive rationality with the endorsement of perceptual experience. The intelligibility of perceptual realism seems to require a better distinction between: facultative rationality (of intuition) and discursive rationality, veridical/illusory perceptions and true/false beliefs. The lack of these distinctions may produce pernicious epistemic fictions because of the high level of dissociation from the perceptual experience of the environment they entail, by incurring in the myth of the given.  

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