Earnings management strategies in BrazilDeterminant costs and temporal sequence

  1. Cesar Medeiros Cupertino 1
  2. Antonio Lopo Martinez 2
  3. Newton C.A. da Costa Jr 1
  1. 1 Federal University of Santa Catarina, Brazil
  2. 2 Fucape Business School, Brazil
Revista:
Contaduría y administración

ISSN: 0186-1042,  2448-8410

Año de publicación: 2017

Volumen: 62

Número: 5

Páginas: 1460-1478

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1016/J.CYA.2016.11.002 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Contaduría y administración

Resumen

Este artículo describe un estudio que analiza las estrategias de manipuladoras de resultados que implican decisiones de contabilidad o actividades reales en Brasil. Se realiza un análisis de las relaciones entre las estrategias manipuladoras de resultados y los costos determinantes de la secuencia temporal en la que se aplican estas estrategias de manejo. Los resultados de las pruebas empíricas indican que la adopción de estrategias manipuladoras depende de sus costos relativos. Existe una relación temporal entre los dos tipos de estrategias para la manipulación de los resultados de fin de ano, ˜ con actividades reales anteriores opciones de contabilidad. También se observó que el nivel de manipulación por parte de las acumulaciones(actividades reales) reducción (aumento) después de la adopción de las IFRS en Brasil.

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