Nothingness and freedom in Heidegger: On how Sartre overlooks the Heideggerian linguistic turn
ISSN: 1984-9206, 1808-107X
Year of publication: 2023
Issue Title: Verão de 2023; eK23051
Volume: 20
Issue: 3
Type: Article
More publications in: Kalagatos: Revista de Filosofia
Abstract
This article begins by revisiting Heidegger’s concepts of nothingness and freedom to later compare them with their Sartrean versions in Being and Nothingness. As such comparison unfolds, it will be argued that the discrepancies that arise between both authors are a consequence of Sartre’s overlooking (at least in his seminal work) of Heidegger’s linguistic turn. Finally, I close by pointing out a central issue of the Sartrean conception of freedom that can be noticed in his treatment of bad faith, and I suggest how taking in consideration the consequences of the linguistic turn may help to fix such issue.
Bibliographic References
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