Normalidad de goznesdel constitutivismo neo-kantiano al conocimiento incondicionado
ISSN: 0210-4857
Année de publication: 2024
Número: 51
Pages: 57-82
Type: Article
D'autres publications dans: Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía
Résumé
The main purpose of this article is to anchor the basic principles of judgmental performances into reality, and thus, to capture the vertical axis of cognition. To this end, it is argued that the normative force of explicit, discursive self-knowledge is neither merely grounded in dialectical inescapability nor in default assumptions. The goal is to argue that the ultimate überhinge is so perfectly known that the questions of justification, truth-value and empirical cognoscibility lose any sense in regards to it. Hinge normativity, which can be reduced neither to epistemic (telic) normativity nor to practical normativity, emerges from this view. The shortcomings of neo-Kantian views of the sources of normativity in gnoseology are exposed and analysed.
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