Disposiciones y puntos de vista causales

  1. Álvarez Toledo, Sebastián 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Salamanca, España
Journal:
Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 1130-0507,  1989-4651

Year of publication: 2018

Issue Title: Puntos de Vista

Issue: 75

Pages: 27-41

Type: Article

DOI: 10.6018/DAIMON/332161 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía

Abstract

This paper is mainly about the ontological signification of dispositional properties, and in order to uphold the causal efficacy of dispositions, it highlights the differences between two points of view on causation: that of efficient causation, which is the usual one, and that corresponding to structural causation. The conclusion is that dispositions are structural causes. However, although both points of view on causation are just different and complement each other, some meaningful conflicts arise between them.

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