¿Por qué unos países redistribuyen más que otros? Una revisión del modelo de Iversen y Soskice

  1. Víctor Gago Rivas 1
  2. Lucía Díaz Benito
  1. 1 Universidad de Salamanca
    info

    Universidad de Salamanca

    Salamanca, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02f40zc51

Journal:
Revista SOCYL

ISSN: 2792-2294

Year of publication: 2022

Issue: 2

Pages: 5-15

Type: Article

DOI: 10.48225/SOCYL202201 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Revista SOCYL

Abstract

The influence of the type of electoral system on economic redistribution is a topic of great relevance for social science. Iversen and Soskice presented a model according to which redistribution would be related to the ideological sign of governments, and this in turn to the type of electoral system. In proportional systems, the left would dominate, promoting greater economic redistribution, as opposed to what would happen in majoritarian systems. The dominance of one party or another depending on the electoral system would be explained by the differential vote of the middle class, which in majoritarian systems fears being expropriated by the lower class, and therefore votes for the right. We test the relevance of Iversen and Soskice's model at the macro and micro level. The results indicate that countries with proportional systems redistribute more than countries with majoritarian systems. However, for the last two decades we find no differences in the ideological sign of the government as a function of the electoral system. Finally, we corroborate that there are differences in the vote of the middle classes depending on the electoral system, voting more to the right in majority systems

Bibliographic References

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Data source: Dialnet